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Stuart E. Schechter, Todd C. Parnell and Alexander J. Hartemink
Financial Cryptography '99, Anguilla, British West Indies, February 1999
We present a series of protocols for authenticating an individual's
membership in a group without revealing that individual's identity and
without restricting how the membership of the group may be changed. In
systems using these protocols a single message to the authenticator may be
used by an individual to replace her lost key or by a trusted third party
to add and remove members of the group. Applications in electronic
commerce and communication can thus use these protocols to provide
anonymous authentication while accommodating frequent changes in
membership. We build these protocols on top of a new primitive: the
verifiably common secret encoding. We show a construction for this
primitive, the security of which is based on the existence of public-key
cryptosystems capable of securely encoding multiple messages containing
the same plaintext. Because the size of our construct grows linearly with
the number of members in the group, we describe techniques for
partitioning groups to improve performance.
Keywords: anonymity, authentication, key replacement, identification,
verifiably common secret encoding
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